



Universitetet  
i Stavanger

# Quorum Selection for Byzantine Fault Tolerance

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**CREDENCE workshop 2019**

**Leander Jehl**


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## Permissioned BFT systems

Hyperledger Fabric, Tendermint, Symbiont, R3 Corda


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- conflicting interests



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
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
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
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
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- caused by a peer
  - exclude



## Excluding replicas for performance

ReBFT: Optimization of PBFT

[Distler et. al, TC'16]




Figure: PBFT: Normal case messages



## Excluding replicas for performance

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


Figure: PBFT: Normal case, masks failure of  $s_4$

## Excluding replicas for performance

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


Figure: ReBFT: Throughput increased by 20%

## Excluding replicas for performance

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



Figure: Omission stops progress

## Excluding replicas for performance

ReBFT: Optimization of PBFT

[Distler et. al, TC'16]



on failure

- fall back to PBFT

Figure: Omission stops progress

## Excluding replicas for fault tolerance

XPaxos:

[Liu et al., OSDI'16]

BFT with  $2f + 1$  nodes in hybrid async/sync model





Figure: XPaxos with  $f = 2$

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### on failure

- try next quorum
- use round robin


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## Excluding replicas for fault tolerance

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### on failure

- try next quorum
  - use round robin
- $\Omega(2^f)$  view changes

Figure: XPaxos with  $f = 2$

## Quorum-Selection

Architecture and algorithm to select a quorum containing correct/well behaved nodes.



## Quorum-Selection: Architecture

### System model

- $\Pi = \{s_1, s_2, \dots\}$  nodes with  $|\Pi| > 2f$
- up to  $f$  arbitrary failures
- asynchronous system with eventually accurate failure detector

## Quorum-Selection: Architecture




Figure: System components

## Quorum-Selection: Architecture

- detection of failures depends on application





Figure: System components

# Quorum-Selection: Architecture

## Failure Detector


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# Quorum-Selection: Architecture

## Failure Detector


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# Quorum-Selection: Architecture

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- detects omissions of **expected** messages
- informed about commission failure/wrong messages



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## Failure Detector Assumptions

eventual strong accuracy

- eventually no suspicions between correct nodes

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
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## XPaxos example

see paper



## Quorum-Selection



# Quorum-Selection

## Quorum-Selection Correctness

- correct processes eventually agree
- processes in the quorum do not suspect each other





Figure: Nodes can disagree on suspicions

# Quorum-Selection

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
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
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
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
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
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
## Metric

how many quorums issued, if failure detector is accurate




## Suspect Graph

- all nodes collect suspicions




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
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
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- find quorum as independent set of size  $n - f$



## Quorum-Selection false suspicions

**Problem** if the failure detector is not accurate, no independent set of size  $n - f$  may exist




Figure: graph without independent set of size 3

## Quorum-Selection false suspicions

**Problem** if the failure detector is not accurate, no independent set of size  $n - f$  may exist

- Solution**
- assign epoch to suspicions
  - when no quorum possible, increase epoch
  - disregard suspicions from old epoch




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- we require  $\mathcal{O}(f^2)$  quorums
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
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**Idea** concentrate suspicions on 2 correct nodes

## Quorum-Selection Variations


### All-to-all algorithms

need to react on any suspicion within quorum



### Leader based algorithms


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
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### Follower-Selection

- assume  $|\Pi| > 3f$
- only  $\mathcal{O}(f)$  quorums

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at most  $6f$  quorums with accurate failure detector

## Quorum-Selection

- architecture
- eventual consistent suspect graph
- quorum as independent set in  $\Theta(f^2)$  changes



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## Open Questions

- other communication patterns
- Follower-Selection with  $|\Pi| = 2f + 1$

Questions?

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



Figure: example graph with  $f = 2$



## Follower-Selection

- find subgraph  $L$ , acyclic with maximum degree 2




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


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


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


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